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SUMMARY 
War as Exit from Exclusion? The Formation of 
Mayi-Mayi Militias in Eastern Congo 
In eastern Congo scores of young and marginalized people have been 
increasingly attracted to the mobilising efforts of new local actors. 
The inquiry into this phenomenon traces the emergence of the first 
militias to the end of the eighties. These first generation militias were 
a result of the growing willingness of marginalized youngsters and 
school drop-outs to form groups of under-aged combatants acting 
51 against eveiy representative of modern political authority and against 
their desperate feelings of exclusion, for which both their political and 
social environment were held responsible. As they had nothing more 
to lose than their marginalisation, rebellion became an option, both as 
a survival strategy and as a strategy of self-defence against a 
predatory political and social order. The shiftiness of their ideological 
basis and allies only further proved what these first militias were 
about: a search for alternatives to a situation of acute deprivation. 
This article reveals that the present RCD rebellion that rages through 
the eastern parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo has had an 
escalating effect on the proliferation of new militias. Before, the 
Kabila-led AFDL rebellion had already offered the already existing 
militias a new cause: that of an anti-Tutsi force fighting against 
foreign occupation. In resistance to the effects of state collapse and 
armed foreign interventions, rural and urban youth today have 
combined former traditions and newly developed patterns of mobility 
in an interpretation of customary and national defence. This has not 
meant that they link up with the traditional emanations of authority. 
Rather, a crisis in the social fabric has meant a shift in authority 
towards these combatants and the use of violence. In addition, shared 
feelings of antipathy towards the 'Tutsi-aggressors ' have facilitated 
the creation of links between these diverse local groupings and other, 
foreign, factions of armed militia roaming the local countryside. 
Consolidation, however, remains unlikely as this shared ideology does 
not run very deep and alliances continuously change. 
The question remains what the future impact of these militias might be 
on the local social order. On the one hand, for several years now in 
some remote areas these armed groupings have become the only 
representatives of any authority structure, even if this structure is 
based on violence. Contrary to other cases, these militias in South 
Kivu are still closely linked to the rural population and have not 
turned against them. On the other hand, the dynamic of the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue has forced their leaders to present their 
grievances to the outside world. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: A DIFFERENT DRUM 
The kind of conflict that currently haunts Eastern Congo challenges 
the traditional notion that violence ought to promote clearly defined 
political objectives. Today, journalists and academicians alike are 
strongly attracted to the premise that this violence is to be interpreted 
as the next demonstration of 'African Barbarism'.
1 Our research 
however, suggests the need for a different perspective in order to 
understand such violence as political. The role of dispossessed youth 
searching for ways to achieve a modicum of status in a much more 
fluid and unpredictable social landscape, has scarcely been high-
lighted. In addition, the scale of the grey and illegal markets (high-
value extractable resources, arms, and drugs) and the possibilities for 
their integration has vastly increased. Violence is used as a means to 
reorganise economic space and control mobility within and between 
spaces. War is then understood as an effort to concentrate violence in 
manageable and exchangeable forms. As Donald Cmmmey states: the 
real challenge is to see violence within its social setting, to appreciate 
its roots in social conflict, and to understand why and how people turn 
to it? Even those cases where rebel movements condone atrocities 
against their own communities (the LRA in Northern Uganda or the 
different militia in Liberia or Sierra Leone for example) should be 
understood as a manifestation of political violence. To a certain 
extent, violence is turned into an attack on society itself, because of a 
deep-rooted crisis of confidence in the principles of social 
accountability of state institutions.
3 In this sense, terror - however 
KAPLAN, R.D., The coming anarchy; how scarcity, crime, overpopulation, 
tribalism, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet, in: The 
Atlantic Monthly, February 1994. 
2 CRUMMEY, D., Introduction: The Great Beast", in: CRUMMEY, D., (ed.), 
Banditry, Rebellion and Social Protest in Africa, London, Portsmouüi, James Currey, 
Heinemann, 1996(2), p. 3. 
3 RICHARDS, P., "New Political Violence in Africa. Secular Sectarianism in Sierra 
Leone", in: GeoJounial, 0, 1999, pp. 1-10. 
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proportioned. The use of exemplary terror provides today an 
alternative option to gain access to power for those generations that 
suffered the effects of educational collapse and social exclusion. This 
stands in contrast to the seventies for example. The generations of 
young Zairians that grew up then, could and did look for meaningful 
social integration via the creation of alternative structures that later 
constituted the bulwark of civil society. But times are very different 
now. In Eastern Congo, the frustration caused by social exclusion is 
shared by a large number of young Congolese that show a growing 
willingness to act against what they perceive to be the root of the 
current crisis, i.e. the so-called Rwandan occupation of their province. 
In what follows we will give center stage to the role of marginalized 
youth in the ongoing conflict. More specifically, we'll focus on the 
genesis of youth militia - in casu the Mayi-Mayi - and the use of 
violence to power a fundamental change in the social structure. We 
will also pay attention to the fact that the boundaries of economic 
space are shifting as well, in such a way that the role of these militia is 
crucial in coupling local to regional and even wider dynamics. Before 
engaging these arguments, we need to briefly situate two stepping 
stones that will allow the reader to contextualize the analysis and see it 
in a historical framework. 
First, the link between the organisation of space and social structure. 
Social fragmentation in Kivu is the outcome of a long process that 
resulted in a different economic use of the available space and the 
mobility of labour within it. In Kivu as in other semi-feudal systems, 
the economic use of space expressed in the land tenure systems 
traditionally reflected the social organisation. The gradual reorgan-
isation of that space by the entrance of new participants via politics 
and the market, especially after independence, eroded the customary 
social organisation. The result was a structural change of rural society, 
most notably a change in the nature of risk pooling at the community 
level (when viewed as a network of households) and at the household 
level itself. The market, rather than the patron-client relations inherent 
in the traditional social structure, increasingly mediated the handling 
54 of risks associated with subsistence living. The nature of these 
changes, in combination with population growth, produced an 
agricultural labour surplus of mostly young men. 
Second, the link between violence and social stratification. 
The principle of stratification under Mobutu -converting political 
loyalty into economic assets - required the regular recycling of the 
political elite, under his proverbial divide-and-rule strategy. As the 
crisis of the state became more pronounced, the available assets 
dwindled. Combining this aspect with the push for democratization in 
the nineties, Mobutu encouraged exit-strategies based on ethnic 
criteria. Local political leaders enforced the suggested exit of a 
particular group by mobilizing outsiders to that group. The loot would 
be based on 'self-service'. Destined to be a self-defeating strategy in 
the long run for Mobutu, it did introduce violence based on ethnic 
identity as a legitimate instrument to bring about change. More 
especially, it upgraded the status of those young men marginalized in 
the customary networks of dependency. The Rwandan refugee crisis 
and the subsequent wars further reinforced the view that violence 
based on ethnicity and earned out by groups of mobile youth had 
become the dominant principle to effect structural change. 
On the basis of these two leads, we posit that the context of state-
disintegration and growing insecurity gave rise to the development of 
new strategies of economic control. Disorder, insecurity and a general 
state of impunity encouraged the formation of new and militarised 
networks for the extraction of economic benefits. Reference to ethnic 
belonging became an integral and crucial part of both strategies of 
control and resistance. Three different but intertwined dynamics can 
be distinguished. First, at a grassroot level, the formation of militia 
offered opportunities to the younger generation to escape from further 
alienation. In the current context, violence actually helps them in their 
search for new forms of integration. Many young Congolese today 
reject the existing social and political order and opt for new egalitarian 
forms of social organisation. Violence as the main mode of discourse 
increases the influence of this generation of 'combatants'. Second, the 
shift to violence as a legitimate tool for social interaction gave rise to 
55 a new kind of local strongmen, in some cases former army-
commanders. These try to control what remains of local market 
structures though militarised informal networks. These 'local 
warlords' find in the existing grassroot militia an easy power-base for 
the protection of their rent-seeking activities, which in turn gave a new 
impulse to militia-formation. Their attempts to coordinate the 
activities of the different branches of the Mayi-Mayi and link them to 
the remnants of Interahamwe
4 and FDD
5 has added an extra 
dimension to the existing conflict. Third, warlordism is not only 
reduced to local actors, but seems to be one of the driving forces of 
some RPA-
 6 and UPDF-
 7commanders actually present in Eastern 
Congo. 
2. THE FORMATION OF ENCLAVES: 
MAYI-MAYI AS STRATEGY OF EXIT 
OR ENTRY? 
Banned from any meaningful political participation, young Congolese 
in Eastern Congo opt for violence as a way to provide a semblance of 
social integration and access to some of the 'fruits of modernity'. 
Besides joining the rural militia, temporarily there was the alternative 
of enrolling in Kabila's rebel army as 'Kadogo' (small one). In 
Bukavu and Goma, hundreds of young people joined the Kabila-led 
AFDL
8 rebel-movement after the defeat of the 'Forces Armées 
4 The interahamwe is a Rwandan militia and one of the executors of the genocide in 
Rwanda in 1994. 
5 The 'Front de la Défense de la Démocratie' is a Hutu-militia that has been instituted 
in the Burundian refugee-camps in eastern Congo. It acts against the Burundian Tutsi-
led regime and since 1998 became part of the Kabila-coalition. 
6 Rwanda Patriotic Army, the official Rwandan army. 
7 Ugandan People's Defence Forces, the Ugandan official army. 
8 Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo/Zaïre, the rebel-
movement that started its military campaign against Mobutu in October 1996 and was 
led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila. 
56 Zaïroises' of the Mobutu-regime. Masasu's presence as one of the 
four leading members of the AFDL was a crucial element in this 
mobilisation campaign. Masasu, himself a young man from Bukavu, 
grew immensely popular with the young crowds as he provided proof 
of a new type of social mobility. The public meetings of the AFDL in 
Goma and Bukavu converted many youngsters from a public of eager 
listeners to active participants in what was presented as a liberation 
war. However, these young people commonly known as 'kadogo', 
were merely driven by opportunist motives rather than by a new 
patriotic spirit as. After all, they had never really known the state as 
anything of substance. As a survey demonstrates, 25 % of the kadogo 
joined the AFDL-forces on the promise of generous compensation, a 
social position, and other material interests.
9 Some 28 % explained 
that the social situation at home and the lack of employment 
opportunities forced them to look for other options, while 15 % said to 
have been convinced by other kadogo. Retribution against the ex-FAZ 
was cited as the main reason by 15 % of the respondents. Only 7 % 
claimed to have joined the AFDL because of a patriotic wish to 
liberate the country from Mobutu's shackles. The survey also revealed 
that most of the young people took their decision without consulting 
their parents. Only 20 % of them became a soldier with the consent of 
their parents. In the field, given their lack of training, the kadogo 
turned out to be one of the weakest links in the army and consequently 
received hardly any battleground responsibility. The best they could 
hope for was to be trained as bodyguards of ranking commanders. 
Most kadogo considered Masasu as their only leader. Following his 
arrest in 1997, most of them were forced to regroup in training camps 
such as Kibomango near Kisangani, where they were almost 
completely excluded from any further military participation.
1
0 Many 
left these camps and joined the ranks of the Mayi-Mayi, while others 
stayed to be integrated in the different rebel armies under Rwandan or 
Ugandan tutelage. Certainly, a sense of frustration with Kabila and a 
9 Unicef-survey, Bukavu, 1997. 
1
0 Actually, Masasu was arrested on the accusation of forming a private militia, while 
conducting a field-campaign to integrate the kadogo into the FAC. 
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elements in those choices. But staying in the army was still 
experienced as a better alternative than going back to their families. It 
might be worthwhile here to qualify the meaning of army as an 
ordered force. The ones present in the DR Congo are to a large extent 
made up of irregulars. As Onyango-Obbo noted in a column in the 
'East African': most of the soldiers in all but two of the foreign armies 
are irregulars, drawn from the riff raff in the villages, petty thieves on 
the streets, demobilised soldiers, and militias.." 
At this point, we need to explain the role and position of the Mayi-
Mayi as a particular expression of social integration and resistance. 
First, the development of organized forms of social resistance does not 
start from scratch, but implies a certain path-dependency. This we 
need to demonstrate. Second, we need to embed the origins of the 
current resurgence of Mayi-Mayi firmly within a dynamics of social 
exclusion. Third, we will argue that a movement like the Mayi-Mayi 
can be considered as a sort of 'enclave'. 
We argue here that the newly formed militia in Eastern Congo should 
be interpreted as experiments with more egalitarian forms of social 
organisation for self-help and protection, with violence as the main 
mode of discourse. Obviously, bizarre patterns of dress, behaviour and 
violence are associated with the Mayi-Mayi. This aspect is associated 
with the use of spiritual products developed by their own spirit-
doctors and diviners ('ganga-Mayi', mostly girls) to become 
invulnerable during military actions. It is their belief that bullets will 
rum into water. What is more relevant however, is the strict moral 
code that aims to create and enforce a form of egalitarianism between 
the different members of the militia. In this sense do the spiritual 
fetishes function as a token of membership and bond between the 
different individuals. From this vantage point, the movement can be 
considered as a sort of 'enclave'. By this we mean an egalitarian 
organisation that differentiates itself from the surrounding social 
structure by its internal organisation and egalitarian attachments, but 
1
1 Charles Onyango-Obbo, The East African, 13 December 1999. 
58 also - and more importantly - by its broad rejection of society as a 
whole
12. In fact this type of organisation should be seen as a reaction 
against the failing state institutions and is presented as an alternative 
to the existing patrimonial social order. In this way, the formation of 
Mayi-Mayi is a social process that - in the rejection of the going 
institutional order - creates a rationality of its own, especially when 
the existing environment offers opportunities to build and exploit 
clandestine trade networks and induces the development of warlord 
activities. The traditional authorities considered the Mayi-Mayi 
initially as an easy instrument to protect their position of control over 
land allocations. More ominously perhaps as an indication of their 
temperament, the movement also served the interests of local 
businessmen from the very start of its resurgence. It is generally 
accepted for example, that Nande-merchants mobilised the Bangilima 
(the local name for the Mayi-Mayi militia) in their competition with 
Tutsi-businessmen to protect their economic position in North Kivu. 
The same ambiguity can be found in the role - and exemplar - played 
by the Zairian army (FAZ). As early as 1986 the FAZ - like the 
Kasindiens (the militia that operated near the Ruwenzori Mountains) 
later - was very active around Beni, officially to prevent Congolese 
dissidents from infiltrating from neighbouring Uganda. In reality, 
local FAZ-officers created a climate of constant insecurity in order to 
protect their private rent-seeking activities such as the control over the 
export of coffee, gold and other minerals. Both the FAZ and the police 
forces were actively involved in the different orchestrations of inter-
ethnic violence. This allowed them to profit from the disorder for their 
businesses as well as gain financially by offering protection to the 
highest bidders. 
All this leaves some questions as to the role and position of the Mayi-
Mayi for the future development of the conflict. Are they merely a 
modem interpretation of traditional brigands or benefactors that seek 
to rid Kivu from ethnic overlords? In order to clarify this issue, we 
have to consider in a bit more detail the context of the ongoing 
1
2 DOUGLAS, M., In the Wilderness: the doctrine of defilement in the Book of 
Numbers, Sheffield, JSOT Press, 1993. 
59 conflict in the Kivu provinces, and how the history of the Mayi-Mayi 
relate to it. 
3. THE PROFILE OF THE MAYI-MAYI 
GROUPINGS 
Of course, it would be very misleading to suggest that all the Mayi-
Mayi groupings are part of one bigger movement. In order to give a 
better idea of the very broad range of motivations, objectives and 
social background of the different militias, a closer analysis is needed. 
Today, the Mayi-Mayi are covering a variety of groups that includes 
both well-defined and structured groups with a clear political agenda 
and loose gangs of social bandits, only using the name of Mayi-Mayi 
to cover their violent behaviour and abuse of the population. The best 
way to demonstrate the very strong differences between the different 
militias is to present their development from a historical approach. 
Local resistance in Eastern Congo did not develop from scratch, given 
a strong foundation of traditional beliefs to build on. At different times 
in a not too distant past, local tribal militia mobilised the population to 
defend the traditional rural order against what were seen as foreign 
(colonial) influences. Examples are the Kitawala in North Kivu and 
the Binji Binji sect in South Kivu in 1931. The name Mayi-Mayi itself 
appeared for the first time during the sixties, when local militia among 
the Babembe in South Kivu allied themselves with the Mulelist 
rebellion against Mobutu's army. The main reason for their existence 
was to counter what they saw as an encroachment upon their tribal 
areas by Banyarwanda in the Fizi-Baraka area. 
Besides of the historical examples, two generations of Mayi-Mayi 
militias can be distinguished: those groupings that started their 
activities before the 1996 AFDL-campaign and those that were 
formed as a consequence of the 1996 and 1998 rebellion. The origins 
of the first generation of Mayi-Mayi have to be located in a dynamics 
of social exclusion. 
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61 Not surprisingly therefore, the Mayi-Mayi resurfaced in the most 
marginalized communities. Already in the early nineties, local youth 
in Congo-Manday and Kasingi (North-Kivu) formed rural and cross-
border gangs known as the Kasindiens. These targeted the existing 
political institutional order, including the power of the traditional 
chiefs which the Kasingiens considered to be 'prostitutes' of Mobutu. 
To conclude therefore that a degree of path-dependency, or historical 
continuity, in the local concept of violent resistance automatically 
translates into a bond between traditional authorities and the Mayi-
Mayi, would be erroneous. From the Kasingiens, the phenomenon of 
militia-formation spread to other regions of Eastern Congo. The 
Kasindiens soon started to co-operate with other militias: the Ngilima, 
based in Lubero and Beni (North-Kivu) drawing its members mainly 
from the Nande (as the Kasingiens did), the Katuku, operating in the 
southern parts of Walikale (North Kivu), and the Batiri, operating in 
Masisi (North-Kivu). 
In North Kivu, a wave of interethnic violence erupted for the first time 
in March 1993. Prior to the conflict, poor Hutu farmers from Masisi 
that had lost their land because the local customary chiefs had sold it 
to rural capitalists of Banyarwanda-origin, had settled in Walikale, 
where they hoped to get access to land that was controlled by Nyanga-
chiefs. Fearing a growing influence of these newly arrived Hutu-
Banyarwanda, both the local population and their chiefs protested 
against their presence and supported the formation of local militias. 
After 1990, also a coalition of Nande and Hunde politicians, who were 
afraid to lose their political power if the Banyarwanda would be 
registered as Zairian nationals and participate in the coming elections, 
started an exclusion campaign to prevent the Banyarwanda from 
political participation. As a reaction, in the Rutshuru region the local 
Banyarwanda association Magrivi (Mutuelle des Agriculteurs de 
Virunga) had encouraged its members to refuse to pay tribute to the 
autochthonous chiefs and no longer recognise their authority. Also the 
Rwandan presidency fomented this conflict in order to cut the support 
lines between the local Tutsi population and the RPF. And finally, the 
indigenous customary authorities in Masisi felt their position 
threatened by the Banyarwanda communities and, within a context of 
intense political animosity, had no other option left than to start a 
62 campaign against these 'foreigners'. The best way to do so, was to 
mobilise the local youngsters that had already shown their 
preparedness to take up their machetes for the defence of their own 
community. 
In March 1993, these militias killed several people at a local market in 
Ntoto. Although these attacks did not spread further into Walikale, 
Hunde-militias started attacking Banyarwanda in Masisi district for 
which they received some help from Nande-militias from Ruwenzori
1
3 
and from local FAZ-elements. The result was a bloody confrontation 
that lasted for more than six months and between 6000 and 10000 
people were killed and more than 250.000 people displaced. At that 
time 'Mayi-Mayi/Bangilima' came to be used as a loose term for the 
description of any local armed youth group, suggesting somewhat 
prematurely a unification of all these local groupings. Since the first 
outbreak of massive violence in North-Kivu however, suggestion and 
reality have grown closer together, as these local militia have played a 
crucial role in the development of informal militarised social 
networks. Fighting became the best way to escape from marginal-
ization because it had proved to offer these militia members with an 
easy access to livelihoods. 
The fragile settlement between the different communities in North 
Kivu, which was eventually forged at the end of 1993 lasted till the 
arrival of more than one million Rwandan refugees and the settling of 
the ex-Far and Interahamwe in the different camps in Masisi and the 
Ruzizi Plains. The presence of the Rwandan refugees had some major 
effects on the local security situation yet at the same time these 
refugees created some new opportunities for the local grassroots 
militias. The position of the Mayi-Mayi during this refugee crisis was 
rather confusing, since their ideology proved to be a very flexible one 
and was mainly created in order to achieve what seemed rather short-
term parochial goals. Two different dynamics interacted. On the one 
1
3 It is said that soon after the arrival of the Nande-fighters in Masisi, serious 
problems arose between them and the local Hunde-fighters, who refused to follow the 
orders of these Nande-commanders. Finally, these Nande were forced to return to the 
Ruwenzori-mountains. 
63 hand, the violent acts of the Interahamwe not only were directed 
against the local Tutsi-population, but also against everyone that was 
not willing to support them, turning the existing rural militias into a 
necessary condition for survival. On the other hand, a generation split, 
which was the result of a growing gap between the 'haves' and the 
'have-nots', pushed a growing number of marginalized young men 
into the direction of the same armed groupings. 
The start of the AFDL-rebellion was the next turning point in the 
history of the Mayi-Mayi militias. First, in communities that 
previously had been untouched by the dynamic of militia-formation, 
rural militias started mushi-ooming. Especially in South Kivu, newly 
formed local militias became important components of the local 
political and military balance of power. According to some local 
observers, the Bembe in Fizi-Baraka had started to resist the AFDL-
rebel movement after one of their priests had been killed by 
Banyamulenge soldiers and given to their dogs. From then on, 
retreating FAZ elements were ordered to hand over their arms, which 
permitted the Bembe-militias to protect themselves against the AFDL-
troops and to settle their old scores with the Banyamulenge. After 
some of then
- neighbours were appointed into key-positions within the 
new AFDL-administration, additional numbers of Bembe youngsters 
felt strongly attracted by the Mayi-Mayi. Even more important were 
local developments in Bunyakiri. Although since the Masisi conflict 
of 1993, local militias (known as Katuku) had been present in this 
region, it was only after the AFDL had taken Bukavu that these 
became significant players in the local power game. Initially, they 
formed a new alliance with Interahamwe and ex-FAR elements 
against the AFDL that was seen as a Tutsi movement. After some 
meetings with Kabila, part of them joined the AFDL-forces while 
others were kept in the forest in order to be able to protect the local 
population when needed. Those who stayed behind would become the 
backbone of one of the best-organised militias operating at present in 
eastern Congo. 
In October 1996, retreating FAZ-elements on their way to Kisangani 
passed through Bunyakiri. Shortly after their arrival they were 
followed by fleeing Interahamwe militias, which rallied the local 
64 population against the Tutsi-led AFDL-movement. The result was a 
conjunction of local and regional actors and a massive mobilisation of 
local youngsters, which found its expression in an intensified 
formation of local militias. For the first time in their existence, these 
local armed groupings could get easy access to weapons, ammunition 
and the logistic help from FAZ- and Interahamwe-elements. Local 
spiritual doctors offered the fighters with the necessary protection and 
invisibility in battle. Also the local population put all its confidence in 
this alliance, which was considered as a patriotic force that was 
fighting against the 'Tutsi-led AFDL-rebels'. 
From December 1996, however, some AFDL-leaders attempted to 
integrate the local fighters in their forces in order to continue their 
advance towards Kisangani. A delegation of both groups met just 
outside the Kahuzi-Biega Pare. After the Batembo-leaders had been 
convinced that the AFDL was a Congolese resistance movement that 
aimed at liberating the country, an agreement was signed about 
military co-operation. The AFDL was offered free passage to 
Kisangani (under the condition that only non-Tutsi fighters would 
pass trough Bunyakiri) and several thousand Mayi-Mayi fighters 
joined the ranks of the AFDL. Yet, not all Mayi-Mayi fighters had 
reinforced the AFDL. On the one hand, for the protection of their own 
community, the Batembo leaders had found it cautious to keep a large 
number of them staying behind. On the other hand, the local 
Interahamwe elements experienced this rapprochement as an act of 
betrayal of their Mayi-Mayi allies and retreated to the forest. 
Those who had stayed behind moved their headquarters to Kambale 
and came to be headed by a certain Padiri. Padiri, who disputed the 
recruitment of thousands of Mayi-Mayi fighters by the AFDL-forces, 
invited the local traditional authorities and other local leaders and 
explained them that the agreement with the AFDL would only bring 
more trouble. From his headquarters, he started reorganising the 
remaining parts of the Mayi-Mayi and continued his battle against the 
Kabila-led coalition. 
After the start of the RCD-rebellion, the local political and military 
landscape once again underwent a total reshuffle. The changing 
65 political environment also had a strong impact on the Mayi-Mayi 
militias because the new context of war and state implosion linked these 
grassroots realities directly to regional political dynamics in the shape of 
informal militaiised networks. On the one hand, the nature of the current 
conflict has wrapped the movement with a fresh legitimacy in its 
struggle against the Rwandan dominance. In this light, the promotion by 
Kabila of some Mayi-Mayi commanders into key-positions of the 
Congolese army has to be explained as a tactical ploy to integrate these 
militias in Ms strategy to gain internal legitimacy, on the basis of an 
ultra-nationalist discourse. On the other hand, the state of disorder 
created the necessary conditions for the formation of new militias and, 
more importantly, for the spreading mihtaiisation of informal social 
networks. 
Contrary to the recent history of militia formation in the Kivus, 
however, from August 1998 the proliferation of militias was mainly 
limited to South Kivu. With the exception of a number of smaller 
Mayi-Mayi groupings between Beni and Butembo and in Walikale, 
from then on, the most important militias were to be found in South 
Kivu. In October 2001, the most influential militia-leaders or 
groupings in North and South Kivu were: 
General Padiri, who is leading the Bunyakiri group but is also 
controlling smaller militias and is without any doubt the most 
influential Mayi-Mayi leader; 
Dunia, the most influential militia-leader of the Bembe 
community; 
Madoa-Madoa and Kayumba, two other Bembe-leaders operating 
in Fizi-Baraka, 
Nakabaka and Zabuloni, former Simba-members and mainly 
operating around Uvira and the Ruzizi Plains 
and the Mudundu 40, the Bashi-militia from Walungu. 
66 As the local balance of power and the existing alliances drastically 
changed, the Mayi-Mayi leaderships were forced to find themselves a 
new political and military position. Due to the efforts of the former 
FAC
I4-general Lwecha, who was also a former Simba and since the 
AFDL rebellion had become one of Kabila's closest allies, some of 
the Mayi-Mayi leaders were ready to reassess their relationship with 
Kinshasa. In return, the Kabila-government supplied them with arms, 
ammunition and instructors, and named some of the militia-leaders to 
top positions in the FAC. From September 1998, Lwecha also tried to 
co-ordinate his efforts with the Forces Armées de Libération contre 
Tutsi (FAL), which has its support base among the Batembo along the 
road between Kisangani and Bukavu, the Forces Armées Populaires 
(FAP) in Fizi-Baraka, and with Burundian and Rwandan Hutu 
militias. In doing so, Kinshasa tried to regain some legitimacy in the 
east and extend its military capacities. Although most Mayi-Mayi 
representatives stressed that this material support was hardly sufficient 
to continue their activities, for most observers it was proof that the 
different militias in the east had become an integral part of the official 
Congolese army. At least, this material support from Kinshasa has 
permitted the Mayi-Mayi militias to intensify its military activities and 
to shift its tactics from hit and run methods to long-term occupation of 
large tracts of land. Their resistance against what was locally 
perceived as a 'foreign occupation', meanwhile had resulted in 
growing popular-support and gave them new symbolic backing. 
Yet, the RCD-rebellion produced an additional effect. A context of 
growing impunity and authority crisis, gave a new dimension to the 
formation of local militias. While initially, the formation of local 
militias could be considered a form of bottom-up violence as a 
solution to social and economic marginalization or appeared to be 
rural based movements of self-defence, since August 1998 the 
distinction between some Mayi-Mayi chiefs and local warlords 
became rather fuzzy. In the present context of state implosion and 
conflict, the importance of the Mayi-Mayi expanded due to the 
attempts of a new class of local strongmen to unify the different 
Forces Armées Congolaises, the present official Congolese army. 
67 ethnically embedded, armed groups for the defence of their vested 
interests. The new tradition of violence and the very strong sentiments 
against the 'foreign occupation' of their province offered opportunities 
for new local strongmen. Militarised informal networks had to make 
possible the continuation of profit-seeking activities through the use of 
violence. The strongly pronounced anti-Tutsi ideology in most cases is 
only a convenient cover pretext for a broad range of local political and 
economic interests. 
Not only local strongmen tried to mobilise these militias for their own 
profit. Also at grassroots level, excluded youngsters started forming 
violent bands, hoping to realise their materialistic dreams. A perfect 
illustration of this dynamic is the Bashi militia. Although in Ngueshe, 
the appearance of Mayi-Mayi can easily explained by the loss of 
political power and economic control of the local Bashi since 1996 
and the destruction of the Royal Tombs by AFDL-elements, other, 
more down to earth reasons could be traced as well. Two sons of an 
uncle of the local mwami joined the Mayi-Mayi partly as a result of a 
local customary conflict between their father and the administrateur 
de territoire. Through the formation of a local branch of the Mayi-
Mayi, they hoped to regain control of the land (which is said to 
contain some gold). Once this militia was instituted, the local Mwami 
and the urban Bashi-elite that was closely associated with the civil 
society in Bukavu, stalled to support this militia and tried to 
restructure it. It was given a new name (Union des Forces pour la 
Libération du Congo or Mudundu 40), and Odilon Kurengamuzima, a 
nephew of the Mwami Ndatabaye, was chosen to be the military 
commander. Officially, this Bashi-militia was instituted as a reaction 
against the presence of Rwandan troops in South Kivu. In reality, it 
had to serve other objectives as well. The Mwami Ndatabaye tried to 
get this militia under his control in order to guarantee his authority 
within the Bashi community. For the civil society leaders, it was the 
perfect instrument to continue its campaign against the rebel forces 
and to politically reposition itself. Nevertheless, in 2000 this Bashi 
coalition fell apart into two groupings. Civil society leaders instituted 
the Parti de Resistance Nationale (PRN). The military wing renamed 
itself Forces de Résistance et de la Défense du Kivu (FRDK), and 
68 stalled talks with the RPA-forces in order to jointly attack the 
Interahamwe-elements that are still present in the Bushi territory. 
4. KOMONA CLAIR: TO BE WISE OR 
CUNNING? 
Based on this historical account, a number of arguments needs some 
specific attention. First, at different levels, war has evolved as an 
alternative way to gain profit, power, and protection. Warlordism 
itself is not limited to local actors, but includes many of the past (ex-
FAZ, ex-FAC) and current (RPA, UPDF) commanders involved in the 
subsequent phases of the conflict in Kivu. Second, the enduring 
context of war and state implosion has created possibilities to link 
grassroot realities directly to regional political dynamics. The Mayi-
Mayi constitute the essence of that link in the shape of an informal 
militarized network. Third, the shiftiness of the Mayi-Mayi reflects 
the success of the alliances between the actors at the different levels, 
in harnessing the potential power of that informal fabric at grassroot 
level for their attempts to gain economic control. 
The arrival of more than one million Rwandan and Burundian 
refugees created massive new opportunities to enforce the link 
between rent-seeking activities and the use of military force, as the 
reports of the UN International Commission of Inquiry on the trade of 
small arms revealed. By bringing together three elements - the 
different military actors and militia of the region (including the 
Interahamwe), the funds lifted from Rwanda's coffers by the 
engineers of the Rwandan genocide, and the logistic facilities 
provided by Mobutu - the refugee-camps provided ideal conditions for 
the unrestrained proliferation of weapons. The position of the Mayi-
Mayi in all this may seem rather confusing. In general, they legitimise 
their actions based on a strongly pronounced ethnic ideology. 
However, the content of this ideology does not prove to be a very 
stable one, as the Mayi-Mayi appear to form shifting alliances in order 
to achieve what seem rather short-term parochial goals. This explains 
why they joined the Kabila-led rebellion against Mobutu but opposed 
69 it when it came to power. The initial support for the AFDL could be 
explained as a continuation of their antecedent conflict with a 
coalition of local Hutu-combatants and Rwandan Interahamwe. The 
familial" explanation is that the Mayi-Mayi started to oppose Kabila 
when the AFDL turned into a Tutsi-led movement, foreshadowing a 
Rwandan occupation. To illustrate this, observers present the 
destruction of the 'royal tombs' in Kabare and the generalized looting 
after the RPA's second invasion, as one of the main motives for the 
formation of new groups of Mayi-Mayi. Without downgrading this 
argument, an alternative explanation underlines that the Mayi-Mayi 
movement shifted allies when Kabila refused to offer them 
compensation for their help in the military campaign against the Hutu 
refugees. On the contrary, as we stated earlier many of them ended up 
in camps such as Kapalata near Kisangani. These camps turned out to 
be mere prison colonies where many died of cholera and malnutrition. 
From 1997 onwards, most of the Mayi-Mayi groups joined forces with 
the roaming bands of defeated Interahamwe, ex-FAR, and Burundian 
FDD. A combined force of Mayi-Mayi, Interahamwe, and Ugandan 
ADF rebels for example, carried out attacks in Western Uganda to 
conquer Nyakahuka airstrip for an air-link and supply-route.
1
5 This 
episode suggests a political consolidation of the movement, as well as 
a military strengthening. Nevertheless, the cloak of 'anti-Tutsism' can 
cover many things. The Mayi-Mayi continue to be a shifty force, 
constituting a flexible and attractive instrument of déstabilisation in 
alliances with aspirant strongmen that often seem hard to fathom. 
The current context of war and state implosion link grassroot realities 
directly to regional political dynamics in the shape of informal 
militarized networks. Emerging local strongmen - be they ex-
Mobutist, ex-FAC, or other - attempt to unify the different, often 
ethnically embedded, armed groups for the defence of their personal 
stakes. As early as 1997 there was a first serious attempt in South-
Kivu to co-ordinate the activities of different Mayi-Mayi groups and 
urban political movements. Since the start of the second rebellion in 
August 1998, renewed attempts to unify all these groups have been 
15 The New Vision, Rwandan, DRCongo rebels implicated in attacks in Western 
Uganda, Kampala, 18 December 1999. 
70 much more successful. On the one hand, the nature of the current 
conflict wraps the movement with a fresh legitimacy in its struggle 
against the Rwandan dominance. In this light, the promotion by 
Kabila of some Mayi-Mayi commanders as part of his ultra-nationalist 
discourse to gain internal legitimacy created a new dynamic and 
resulted in an increase of military activity. On the other hand, the 
actual state of disorder creates the necessary conditions for the 
formation of new militia and, more importantly, for the further 
militarization of informal social networks. 
One of the most striking consequences of the RCD
16-rebellion that 
stalled in 1998, is the increased militarization of society. Not only 
there is the formation and disintegration of new rebel-movements. The 
ongoing state of disorder also favours the development of militia, 
which are offering new opportunities for the younger generations. 
More important even is the tendency in the countryside of a shift of 
authority within each community to the advantage of a new class of 
warlords. Since 1998, Mayi-Mayi groupings no longer are only joined 
by young and marginalized peasants, but also by a class of better-
educated urban youth. In most cases, these new recruits are driven by 
personal economic motives rather than by patriotic or nationalistic 
sentiments. There is no doubt, however, that the actual strength of the 
Mayi-Mayi is closely related to attempts of the Kinshasa-government 
since the Lusaka Agreements to mobilise these militia in its attempts 
to open a second front in the Eastern provinces. Since August 1999, 
there is a strong growth in military capacities and activities of these 
grassroot militias in both North and South Kivu. The Mayi-Mayi 
leaders Dunia around Fizi and Baraka, Padiri around Bunyakiri, 
Shikatende in the Moyen Plateaux and Luecha in Shabunda and 
Mwenga regularly receive military support since their appointment as 
FAC Commanders in September 1999. But also the encouragement of 
Interahamwe and FDD-militia to create local militia in order to 
legitimize their existence, explains the increase in military strength of 
the Mayi-Mayi. Especially in South Kivu, many Mayi-Mayi groupings 
1
6 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie, the Rwandan supported rebel 
movement that started its military campaign against the Kabila-regime in August 
1998. 
71 are now trained and controlled by Interahamwe or FDD-leaders. For 
the RCD, today the Mayi-Mayi pose a serious military threat. As a 
local RCD-Commander stated: Us sont maintenant capables de se 
présenter sur un front large et de mener des opérations militaires, ce 
qui est nouveau. A coalition of FDD, Interahamwe and Mayi-Mayi is 
controlling large parts of the countryside, while violence in South 
Kivu is also moving to the outskirts of Bukavu. 
Since the end of 1999, the security situation has mainly deteriorated in 
mining districts. As militia-leaders now control most of the economic 
activities in mineral-rich zones, the Mayi-Mayi groupings, as well as 
the Interahamwe and FDD are creating their own local war-economies 
and are getting economically stronger. Important with a view to the 
eventual resolution of the conflict in Congo, the actual state of 
disorder offers the conditions necessary for the formation of new 
patterns of economic control, and hence for the perpetuation of the 
conditions that sustain the conflict. At different levels, war is 
becoming a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and 
protection.
1
7 Even at the grassroot level, economic relations are 
highly militarised. There is of course the well-known and rather 
'traditional' plundering by diverse military. Grossly underpaid - if 
paid at all - soldiers survive by looting, harassment, and robbery. 
Local commanders often orchestrate these episodes of looting, turning 
into small entrepreneurs themselves. In regions that are under control 
of the Mayi-Mayi, combatants force the local population to perform 
manual labor and to pay taxes at local markets.
1
8 The development of 
waiiordism as a strategy of economic control is giving new impulses 
to the dynamics of militia-formation. The shift to violence gave rise to 
a new kind of local strongmen (in most cases former army-
commanders), that try to control the remaining local markets through 
militarised informal networks. These 'local warlords' find in the 
existing grassroot militia an easy power-base for the protection of 
their rent-seeking activities. Their attempts to coordinate the activities 
KEEN, D., The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper, no., 
320, 1997. 
1
8 Author's interview, Bukavu, May 1999. 
72 of the different branches of the Mayi-Mayi and to link them to the 
remnants of Interahamwe and FDD have given another dimension to 
the existing conflict. Most notably, new local strongmen are 
developing strategies to gain control over the artisanal production of 
high-value goods. Since September 1998 for example, a former FAC-
general has been inciting ethnic strife while recruiting fighters among 
the Warega in the gold-rich regions of Kamituga and Mwenga (South-
Kivu). In order to establish control over the local exploitation of gold 
around Kamituga and to modify existing trade patterns, he attempted 
to co-ordinate with the different Mayi-Mayi groups and Burundian 
and Rwandan Hutu-militia in the area. Another leader controls the 
Lulingu gold mines, while it is believed that a third Mayi-Mayi leader 
controls the existing trade-patterns of gold between Tanzania and 
South Kivu. 
Warlordism, however, is not limited to local actors. It seems to be one 
of the driving forces of some RPA- and UPDF-commanders present in 
Eastern Congo. The most important level of rent-seeking activities 
enforced by the use of violence, is without any doubt that of the 
external forces involved in the DRC-conflict, as was confirmed by 
two recent UN-reports on the illegal exploitation of natural resources 
in the DR Congo. This 'external greed' is indicated by the extent of 
commercial activities in Eastern Congo developed by some RPA-and 
UPDF-commanders close to the political centres in Kigali and 
Kampala. This puts forward the question whether this practice of 
pillaging is a consequence of the actual state of disorder and conflict 
or, to the contrary, should be understood as functional for those 
controlling these illicit networks. Without proffering definite answers, 
there is solid ground to doubt whether security reasons were the sole 
motivation for the Rwandan and Ugandan support of the second 
rebellion. Even a strong military presence in the DRC could not 
manage to seal the borders between Congo and Uganda and Rwanda 
to insurgents. They could not prevent the killing of eight tourists in 
Bwindi in March 1999 or the reassembling of some 4000 Interahamwe 
as they moved from Walikale to Burundi. It would be more realistic to 
state that the intervention in Zaire since 1996 opened up important 
commercial opportunities and made it possible to extract extensive 
economic rents through the exploitation of local mines. Both Ugandan 
73 and Rwandan officers are actively involved in the exploitation of gold 
and other high-value goods such as colombite-tantalite (coltan). These 
activities were made possible by Kabila's initial attitude of laissez-
faire. Examples are the creation of the company 'Caleb International' 
in Kisangani by Salim Saleh - Museveni's half-brother and general of 
the UPDF - in 1997, in view of getting a monopoly over the 
production of the Kilomoto goldfields.
1
9 Once Kabila came to power 
however, he showed his determination to reduce the rent-seeking 
activities of his Eastern allies and get a better grip on local mining 
production himself. This of course heightened frictions between the 
former allies from the start of 1998 onwards. The support of the 
second so-called rebellion again suggests the primacy of economic 
interests over security reasons. Both on the Ugandan and Rwandan 
side, rmlitaro-cornmercial lobbies profit from a context of insecurity to 
increase their control over the remaining economic fabric, often 
mobilising local businessmen in Goma, Bukavu or Kisangani, and 
linking up with international commercial partners.
2
0 Activities are not 
limited to the exploitation of mines but include the control over the 
import of petrol and other more mundane products such as cigarettes. 
In the RPA-controlled areas, Rwandan agents have been assigned to 
all revenue-generating services. Military entrepreneurs take advantage 
of a climate of insecurity, but also cause further tension due to their 
differing individual interests, as evidenced by the frequent clashes 
between the RPA and the UPDF in Kisangani. 
1
9 In the fiscal year 1996-1997, Uganda earned over $100m from the export of gold, 
adding it to the country's major foreign exchange earners. In comparison, the previous 
fiscal years of 94-95 and 95-96 yielded resp. $ 12.44m and $35m. As an article in the 
New Vision reports on 24/05/97, the 'increase was attributed by an official of the bank 
to some gold leakages into Uganda from neighbouring Zaire'; Frank Van Acker, 
Beyond Berlin, NCOS mimeo, June 1998. 
2
0 The crash of a little Cessna plane of Tropical Airways in October 1998 in Beni 
raised some questions about the activities of some influential Ugandans in the DRC. 
One of the people that died during this crash was Jet Mwebaze of De Beers, who was 
involved in a gold deal in collaboration with Salim Saleh. 
74 5. CONCLUSION: VIOLENCE AND THE 
SOCIAL ORDER 
Contrary to most observers, we have tried to understand the Mayi-
Mayi militias as an autonomous dynamic rather than as a local 
reaction against the presence of foreign troops. Categorising these 
militias in terms of their own self-description would have been as 
misleading as condemning the naked militia-fighters at the border-gate 
in Goma as a manifestation of social deviance, encouraged by their 
Rwandan or Tutsi-enemies. Rather than nominating the Mayi-Mayi 
fighters as a resistance movement driven by nationalistic ideals, we 
have tried to present their rebellion as a reaction against marginal-
ization and exclusion and an option to despair. Even if today many 
youngsters feel attracted by the anti-Rwandan discourse of their 
leaders, this philosophy is not a cause of their existence but is 
facilitating the further proliferation of militias by offering it a very 
sexy ideological underpinning. 
The question remains what, on the long term, will be the effects on 
their rebellion on the existing social order. Will the random Mayi-
Mayi fighter shift towards the Lord's Resistance Army
 21-type warrior 
that is turning violence into an attack upon society itself? If the acts 
of their Bumndian comrades-in-arms are to be seen as a precursor of 
their own behaviour, then their recent abduction of an important 
number of children in order to train them as FDD-fighters can only 
lead us to some very grim prospects. So far, we do not believe that this 
will also happen in eastern Congo in the near future. Neither do we 
think that the Mayi-Mayi militias will progress towards a 
Revolutionary United Front-alike rebel-movement. The present Mayi-
Mayi militias, with the exception of the roaming bands of social 
bandits acting under the banner of Mayi-Mayi, are still very attached 
to the rural society in which they recruit their fighters and operate. 
Even more, most of their aims and objectives are concentrated on the 
protection and development of their own communities. 
2
1 This militia operates in Northern-Uganda and is characterised by its terror against 
the local population. 
75 This is not to say that the proliferation of militias in the Kivus is not 
producing any effects at all on the social order at all. The presence and 
actions of the Mayi-Mayi does have some severe effects on the 
existing rural order. First, the present conflict and proliferation of 
aimed militias is realising a shift in authority to the advantage of those 
in charge of armed groupings. As we have illustrated, a fierce 
competition between a new generation of militia-leaders and the 
traditional authorities can be witnessed. This is not a new 
phenomenon, as it was already one of the guiding forces of some 
militia-members in the sixties to replace the traditional chiefs and 
become the new leaders of their own ethnic community. Today, 
however, some Mayi-Mayi leaders have been more successful and 
have replaced the traditional authorities and have become the true 
leaders of those regions under their control. This shift of control is not 
limited to the leadership of communities but is also affecting lower 
levels of authority such as the family-leadership. Second, the militias 
are providing the fighters with a renewed identity, defined by their 
position as Mayi-Mayi fighter. Initiation rituals transform them into a 
protected guard of their community, but at the same time are clearly 
cutting the link with their former social environment. After being 
initiated, they live in a totally new environment, characterised by a 
different order and authority structure than the society they aie 
originating from. Even when the rural population is supporting the 
activities of the militias, its members become alienated from their own 
families. This brings us to the third impact on the rural social order. 
Because being a rebel at present is becoming a career option for many 
youngsters, the local economic order is seriously affected as well. 
Contrary to similar militias in other regions, however, Mayi-Mayi 
militias do not represent a revival of local patrimonial power, because 
the population increasingly becomes estranged from the militia-
members. As a recent UN-report on the exploitation of resources in 
D.R.Congo states: [the Mayi-Mayi militias] se battaient contre 
l'Armée patriotique rwandaise (ARP) et le RCD pour les empêcher 
d'avoir accès à des ressources telles que la colombo-tantalite, les 
diamants et l'or. Ils considèrent que les revenus tirés de l'exploitation 
de ces ressources sont l'unique raison d'être de la poursuite de 
76 l'occupation par les militaires rwandais.
22 Meanwhile, they are 
exploiting part of the mining centres themselves. Besides of the local 
mining industry, these militias are also trying to control the informal 
trading networks that have been traditionally the basis of everyday 
life. For the exploitation of these networks, the social mobility of the 
population has to be restrained and put under their management. 
The question remains, in which direction the present militias will 
develop. Today a first serious disaffection from their social back-
ground can be noticed. One of the sourest observations is that the 
Mayi-Mayi might eventually become a movement that is only directed 
at the survival of its own structures and, if necessary, will turn into an 
attack against the local rural society. Probably much will be 
depending on the position of the rural population, but also on the 
present dynamics of conflict. Also would it be very premature to see 
in these militias the potential of a new political force. As 
demonstrated, several constraints prevent the formation of a unified 
and centralised movement. Perhaps one would better not try to push 
the militia-leaders into the direction of the political game because the 
reward the young fighters would receive of their new leaders risks 
being very low, if any reward would be granted at all. 
2
2 UNITED NATIONS, Addendum to the Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal 
Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, New York: UN Security Council, 10 November 2001, p. 26. 
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